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Article 4

WAGE GARNISHMENT IN NEBRASKA
Helen B. Beisheim
I. INTRODUCTION
The typical wage earner in this country is in debt. He owes on
his car, his air conditioner, his television set, and if he accepted
the invitation so generously extended to fly now and pay later, he
owes on last year's vacation. He is in debt not because he likes to
be but because this is the American way of life.' Our economy
hums along on revolving charge accounts. Mr. and Irs. Consumer
show off their credit cards with the same sense of pride as an old
soldier points to his campaign ribbons. It is little wonder that many
low and middle income families longing for the good things of life
become overextended in their zeal to keep up with the Jones's.
While the typical wage earner may be in debt, he is well-meaning
and honest. When he bought the car, the air conditioner and the
television set, he intended in good faith to pay for them in full and
on time. Then something unexpectedly went wrong. He did not
figure on being laid off at work, or his car breaking down, or his
wife having twins. If the truth be told, he probably did not figure
at all. If he had, simple arithmetic would have shown that his
take-home pay was too small an umbrella to cover the regular and
recurring necessaries of life, installment payments on goods needed
but not "necessaries," and, in addition, the unforeseen contingencies
that seem to hit the small consumer the most often.2 Eventually
he falls behind in his payments. The agency to whom the doctor
sent his bill for collection sends him a first, a second and then a
third notice. As a last resort it sends him a final notice threatening
to garnish his wages. At this point the debtor pays something if
he can, but quite often he can not. As he looks at the pink paper and
the words "FINAL NOTICE" printed in bold face type, he wonders,
* B.A., 1967, Grinnell College; J.D., 1970, University of Iowa. Associate,
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law.
1 Total consumer credit increased from $90,314 million as of December
31, 1965, to $12,804 million as of December 31, 1970. Approximately
four-fifths of this amount represents installment credit. FED. Rss.
BULL., April 1971, at A 54.
2 A 1966 survey of consumer expenditures by the General Bureau of
Labor Standards determined that the average family having an
income of less than $4,000 per year overspends that income. U.S.
BUREAu or LABOR STANDARDs, DEr'T. or LABOR, FACT SHEET No. 4-f,
POOLI=G AND GARxISHNmET IN RELATON TO CONSUmiER INDEBTEDNESS 1
(1966).
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"What is garnishment?"; and he keeps wondering because he feels
that he cannot afford to ask a lawyer.3
II. WHAT IS GARNISHMENT
Garnishment has its origin in an institution called foreign attachment developed in England during the Middle Ages. The
custom of certain cities permitted a creditor whose debtor could
not be found to attach the goods of the debtor in the hands of
third persons within the city or the debts owed to the debtor by
such third persons. The notice of attachment delivered to the third
person was called garnishment. The debtor could obtain the release
of the attached goods or credits by surrendering his person or
furnishing bail, but in the event of default the creditor could, after4
judgment, obtain satisfaction out of the goods and credits attached.
Eventually, like the domestic attachment, garnishment was transformed into a provisional remedy for the collection of debts. As a
result, in the majority of states, including Nebraska, garnishment
is essentially a method of attachment designed to reach property of
the debtor in the possession of a third party.5
Today garnishment is commonly defined as a statutory process
by which property, money or credits of the defendant-debtor which
are owed to him or held for him by another, the garnishee, are
applied to the payment of the debt owed by the defendant-debtor
to the plaintiff-creditor. 6 It is in essence an ancillary proceeding,
being dependent upon the suit between the plaintiff-creditor and
the defendant-debtor. 7 When brought before judgment in that suit,
it must necessarily await its outcome.8 When brought after judgment, it is designed to aid in the collection process, seeking to
reach assets of the defendant-debtor in the hands of third personsY
In this respect it differs from attachment which involves only the
3

Not all communities have a Neighborhood Legal Services office or a
legal aid office and in those communities which do provide free legal
assistance to the indigent, many of the residents do not know of its
existence.

4

Mussman & Riesenfeld, Garnishment and Bankruptcy, 27 MViNx. L.
REV. 1 (1942); Riesenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in American
Law-A Historical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 IowA L. REV. 155
(1957).
Insurance Co. of North America v. Maxim's of Nebraska, 178 Neb. 274,
132 N.W.2d 885 (1965).
Beggs v. Fite, 130 Tex. 46, 106 S.W.2d 1039 (1937).
Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Leslie, 55 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Ill. 1944).
Hoagland v. Rost, 126 F. Supp. 232 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
Sanders v. Strauss, 332 Ill. App. 314, 75 N.E.2d 128 (1947).

5
6

7
8

9
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rights of the plaintiff-creditor to property in the possession of the
defendant-debtor. 0 As applied to wages, the employer is the garnishee and the employee is the defendant-debtor. The object is to
require the employer to pay all or part of the employee's wages to,
or for the account of, the plaintiff-creditor."
III. GARNISHMENT PROCEDURES IN NEBRASKA
The garnishment statutes of Nebraska are contained in three
subdivisions of Chapter 25 of the Revised Statutes 1943 (Reissue
1964). They are entitled "Attachment" (sections 25-1001 to-1005),
"Garnishment in Aid of Execution" (section 25-1056), and "Exemptions" (sections 25-1552 to-1563).
A. GAmusinvmNT AFTE JtmEyT
In cases where judgment has been entered, the plaintiff (judgment creditor) fies an affidavit stating that he has good reason to
believe that the person named as garnishee has property of, and
is indebted to, the defendant (judgment debtor). A summons is
then issued requiring the garnishee to answer within ten days the
written interrogatories served with the summons. Pending further
proceedings the garnishee must hold all property and credits of
the defendant in his possession or under his control until further
order of the court.'
The statute states explicitly that the garnishee must answer all
the written interrogatories put to him concerning the property and
credits of the defendant in his possession or under his control at
the time of the service of the summons, and he must disclose the
amount owed by him to the defendant, whether due or not.13 The
garnishee may, if he desires, pay the money owed to the defendant
into court and receive his discharge, in which case he is allowed
his costs.14 If the garnishee fails to answer, he is presumed to be
indebted to the defendant in the full amount of the plaintiff's claim,
and upon notice, judgment may be entered against him for such
amount as the court finds due.15 If the garnishee answers that he
has property of the defendant or is indebted to him, the court may
10 Frank F. Fasi Supply Co. v. Wigwam Investment Co., 308 F. Supp. 59
(D. Hawaii 1969).
11 6 Am. Jun. SEcoND Attachments and Garnishments § 3 (1963).
12 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1056 (Reissue 1964).
13 NEB.REv. STAT. § 25-1026 (Reissue 1964).
14 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1027 (Reissue 1964).
15 NEB.REv. STAT. § 25-1028 (Reissue 1964).
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order that such property be delivered to the court or that the
indebtedness be paid into the court, or the court may permit, upon
the execution of a proper bond, 16 the garnishee to retain the property or amount owing. If the answer of the garnishee is unsatisfactory or he fails to comply with the order of the court, the plaintiff
may file an application for the determination of the liability of the
garnishee. The answer of the garnishee, if one has been filed, and
the application filed by the plaintiff constitute the pleadings upon
7
which the issue of the liability of the garnishee is tried. If it
appears at the trial that the garnishee is indebted to the defendant
or has property or credits of the defendant in his possession, he is
held liable to the plaintiff in the full amount of the judgment which
cannot be in excess of the amount of such indebtedness or property
held by him.'8 In the case of multiple attachments the court, on
motion of any of the plaintiffs, may order a referee to ascertain
and report the amounts and priorities of the several attachments. 19

B. GARmsH mm BEFoRE JuDGMEm
In cases where an action has been commenced but judgment has
not yet been entered, the plaintiff (creditor) may file an affidavit
for attachment alleging (a) the nature of his claim, (b) that it is
just, (c) the amount which he believes ought to be recovered, (d)
the existence of a lawful ground for attachment, 20 and (e) that he
has good reason to believe that the person named as garnishee has
property of the defendant (debtor) in his possession that cannot be
levied upon by attachment. 2' A lawful ground for attachment exists
when the defendant (a) is a foreign corporation or a nonresident,
(b) has absconded with the intent to defraud his creditors, (c) has
left the county of his residence to avoid the service of a summons,
16

NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1029 (Reissue 1964).

NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1030 (Reissue 1964).
18 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1030.02 (Reissue 1964).
17

19 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1037 (Reissue 1964).
20 Nm. REV. STAT. § 25-1002 (Reissue 1964).
21 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1010 (Reissue 1964). The nature of garnishment
before judgment is discussed in the recent case of Insurance Co. of
North America v. Maxim's of Nebraska, 178 Neb. 274, 132 N.W.2d 885
(1965). The issue was whether in garnishment proceedings brought
under § 25-1010 a bond must be given as required by § 25-1003 in
garnishment suits. The plaintiff contended that a bond was not required on the ground that § 25-1010 does not specifically require one,
and that this statute stands by itself. The court did not agree, stating:
"Garnishment procedure provided for in section 25-1010, R.R.S. 1943,
is not independent from the other sections of the attachment statute."
Id. at 275, 132 N.W.2d at 88.
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(d) so conceals himself that a summons cannot be served upon him,
(e) is about to remove his property, or a part thereof, out of the

jurisdiction of the court with the intent to defraud his creditors,
(f) is about to convert his property into money for the purpose of
placing it beyond the reach of his creditors, (g) has property or
rights in action which he conceals, (h) has assigned, removed,
disposed of, or is about to dispose of his property, or a part thereof,
with the intent to defraud his creditors, or (i) fraudulently con22
tracted the debt for which suit is about to be or has been brought.
It is obvious that since prejudgment garnishment is limited to
debtors who are nonresidents or who are attempting to abscond or
-otherwise defraud their creditors, this collection device is not available in the case of the ordinary debtor who is neither a nonresident
nor an intentional "skip." This limitation avoids the injustice of
having garnishment served on the debtor's employer before a judicial determination of what, if anything, the debtor owes. More
important, this limitation would appear to save the statute from
being held unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the
"fundament al principles of procedural due process" within the
meaning of Sniadach v,Family Finance Corporationof Bay View. 23
In this case the United States Supreme Court invalidated Wisconsin's prejudgment garnishment statute. However, the majority
-opinion expressly recognized that summary procedure may meet
the requirement of due process in situations requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest.2 Debtors whose conduct
.amounts to fraud and foreign debtors who have assets within the
state may be regarded as typifying such situations. 25
Because prejudgment garnishment of wages is thus limited to
:special circumstances, garnishment in Nebraska is as a practical
-matter confined to post-judgment debtors. This does not seriously
impair its usefulness. Most collection suits are quickly reduced to
judgment. This is especially true if the creditor holds a power of
attorney to confess judgment. It is also true in the absence of such
a power since in most cases the debtor defaults either because he
has no defense or because defending calls for a degree of sophistication in legal matters which he does not possess.28
REv. STT. § 25-1001 (Reissue 1964).
395 U.S. 337 (1969).

22 NE.
23

24 Id. at 339.
25 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
-28

Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 759,
768.
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IV. JUSTIFICATION FOR RESTRICTING
WAGE GARNISHMENTS
27
Every state restricts in some manner the garnishment of wages.
A few states exempt all wages. 28 Some states exempt all wages
where needed for the support of the debtor's family.29 Many states
exempt a percentage of the debtor's wage. 0 Six states exempt a
fixed amount.31 And the largest number of states exempt a percentage or a fixed amount, whichever is the greater.82 The differences are not surprising. The exemptions that a particular legislature adopts are the result of a compromise between the interests
of the creditor, the debtor and the public. These competing interests
C.C.H. CONSumER CREDIT GUIDE 660; see generally Brunn, Wage
Garnishments in California:A Study and Recommendations, 53 CALIF.

27 1

L. REV. 1214 (1965).
§ 222.11 (1961); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2602 (Supp.
1970); TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 28.
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93-5816 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-362
(1969); OKLA. STAT. tit. 31, §§ 1, 4 (1) (1955); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1731

28 FLA. STAT.
29

(1962); S.D. CODE § 15-20-12 (1967).
30 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 630 (1960); Apiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1594, 33-1126
(1956); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 690.6 (1970); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 77-2-4 (1963); DEL. CODE ANN. § 4913 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. §§
16-572, 16-573 (Supp. 1970); HAwAI REv. LAWS § 652-1a (1971); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 34-1-44-7 (1971); McH. COmP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.4011

(3), 600.7511 (2)(3) (1968); MIss. CODE ANN. § 307.10 (Cum. Supp.
1968); Mo. REv. STAT. § 525.030 (Cum. Supp. 1970); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-1558 (Cum. Supp. 1969); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2A-17-50, 2A-17-56
(Supp. 1970); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 5231 (b) (e) (McKinney Supp. 1970);
UTAH CODE ANN.

§

78-23-1(7)

(1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-5A-3

(1966); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-442 (1957).
31 ALAsKA STAT. § 09.35.080(1) (1962); ARK. CONST., art. 9, § 182; MASS.
GEN. LAWS ch. 246, § 28 (1932), as amended by Laws 1969, ch. 276,

32

and Laws 1971, ch. 475; N.H. REV. STAT. § 512.21 (II) (Supp. 1970);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-26-4 (1956); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3020(5)
(Supp. 1971).
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-361 (Supp. 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-208
(Supp. 1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 11-207 (Supp. 1970); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 62, § 73 (Supp. 1970); IOWA CODE § 642 (Supp. 1971); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-2310 (Supp. 1970); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.010(2) (1969);
LA. REV. STAT. tit. 13, § 3881 (Supp. 1970); MD. CODE ANN. art. 9,
§ 31 (Supp. 1970), as amended by Laws 1971, ch. 768; MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 550.37 (13), 571.05 (Supp. 1970); NEv. REV. STAT. § 21.090(h)
(1967), as amended by Laws 1971, ch. 640, § 7.5; N.M. STAT. ANN. §

36-14-7 (Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-09-02 (Supp. 1971); Omo
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2329.62(c), 2329.66(F) (Supp. 1970); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 23.185 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 26-207, 26-208 (Supp. 1970);
VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (Supp. 1970); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.32.280,
as amended by Laws 1970, ch. 61; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 272.18
1970).

(Supp.
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were reflected in the pressures brought to bear on the draftsmen of
the new federal Consumer Credit Protection Act.83 The first draft
provided for a blanket prohibition against the garnishment of wages.
This was then abandoned as unduly restricting honest and ethical
creditors while permitting debtors capable of paying their debts to
escape such responsibilities. 34 As a result a percentage type of
exemption was adopted which was initially fixed at 90 per cent and
later reduced to 75 per cent.8 5 Congress found that the job of striking
an acceptable balance between the creditor's interest in collection,
the debtor's interest in protection and the public's interest in common decency is complex and controversial. Or to put it another
way, the task of balancing the social costs of wage garnishment
against its economic advantages proved most formidable because
such costs and advantages are not capable of exact measurement
or even measurement within tolerable limits. Under the circumstances, Congress may have done the best it could to put together
legislation which would have the necessary votes for passage.
The justification for imposing restrictions on wage garnishment
has been the subject of considerable investigation and research in
recent years. In general the writers focus their attention on three
areas which they regard as critical: family deprivation, job insecurity and bankruptcy.38
A. FA mnY DEPRmVATION
Wage garnishment is generally recognized as a drastic remedy.
Even the toughest collection agency uses it only as a last resort to
83

15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1968).

34 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEws 1978.
35 Id. at 2029.
36

Brunn, supra note 27. See also, Comment, Wage Garnishment in New
York State: PracticalProblems of the Employer, 34

ALBANY

L. REv.

395 (1970); Comment, Wage Garnishment: Reform of the Law in
Kansas, 18 K.-. L. REV. 925 (1970); Comment, Wage Garnishment in
Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REV. 743 (1968); Note,
Wage Garnishment in Kentucky, 57 KEr. L.J. 92 (1968); Note, Wage
Garnishment as a Collection Device, supra note 26; Note, Garnishment in Florida: Analysis, Assessment, and Proposals, 19 U. FLA. L.
REV. 99 (1966); LaGrone, Recovery of a FloridaJudgment by Garnishing Wages of the Head of a Family, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 19 (1964); Note,
State Wage Exemption Laws and the New Iowa Statute-A Comparative Analysis, 43 Iowa L. REv. 555 (1958); Note, Garnishment in Kentucky-Some Defects, 45 Ky. L.G. 322 (1957); Abrahams & Feldman,

The Exemption of Wages from Garnishment-Some Comparisons and
Comment, 3 DE PAUr. L. REv. 153 (1954); Note, Garnishment of Wages
in Ohio, 21 U. CINu. L. REv. 268 (1952).
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collect debts owing to its clients. The reason is not difficult to see.
While attachments and levies in execution seize property of the
debtor which is useful to him, wage garnishment takes from him
the means necessary to support himself and his family and to pay
his other debts. Without some protection the probable result is
financial disaster with all the attendant problems that this creates
for society. 7 For this reason all parties in interest generally agree
that some portion of a debtor's wage should be exempt. The question is, how much? To answer by saying, "enough to keep him and
his family from want," is helpful but not definitive unless agreement
is reached on a particular level of want.
The standard most commonly used in fixing a poverty line is the
index developed by the Social Security Administration based on the
Department of Agriculture's Economy Food Plan. According to this
index a nonfarm family of four required in 1968 a minimum income
of $3,553 per year to buy a subsistence level of goods and services.38
This figure must of course now be adjusted upward because, as
every housewife knows, the cost of living has continued to zoom. In
contrast to this poverty index are the estimates of the U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics showing the spring 1970 costs of its three
budgets for an urban family of four. The average budget cost
ranged from $6,960 a year at a lower level, to $10,664 at an intermediate level, and to $15,511 at a higher level.39 It is assumed that
the larger figure includes an allowance for purchasing at least some
of the amenities of contemporary life.
Even if we accept $3,553 as representing the minimum income
necessary to keep the wolf from the door, the appalling fact is that
only a few states assure a working man of an exemption of this
amount. In the great majority of states the take-home pay of the
low income debtor may be reduced by garnishment to the point
where he is left without adequate funds to pay for food, clothing,
rent, transportation, taxes, insurance, doctor's visits, and other goods
and services vital to the maintenance of a minimum standard of
living. So he borrows money to pay for some goods and he purchases others on credit. Unfortunately this has a domino effect. It
is in this respect that garnishment is unlike other remedies which
the creditor has at his disposal. It worsens an already bad situation
because it deprives the wage earner and his family of the neces37 Note, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, supra note 26, at 762.
38 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,

1970 at 327, table No. 498.

39 U.S. BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, MONTHLY LABOR

REVIEw 59 (January 1971).
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saries of life. The social costs that result from such deprivation are
difficult to estimate. The brutal fact is that the costs are enormous
for poor debtors and do not just fade away; they remain to haunt
the alleys, ghettos and prison yards of this country.
B. JoB INsEcuRITy
Recent studies reveal rather clearly that garnishment of an
employee's wages may cost him his job. Random interviews with

employers indicate that prior to July 1, 1970, the effective date of
federal restrictions on garnishment, the practice in Nebraska was
roughly the same as elsewhere.

Some employers dismissed the

employee-debtor at the first garnishment. Some employers waited
until the second garnishment. Other employers, upon receipt of
the summons, called the employee in and suggested that he work
out an arrangement with the creditor for payment of the debt. In
the event that the employee was unwilling or unable to do this,
he was given his walking papers.4 0 This practice will presumably
continue subject to the federal prohibition against discharging an
employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have been subjected
to garnishment for any one indebtedness. 41
What seems to be a harsh practice is understandable from the
viewpoint of the employer. He detests garnishment. In the first
place there is the inconvenience of accepting service of the summons.
Then there is the bother and expense of filing an answer to all the
interrogatories served with the summons. The price for failing to
file an answer is to be held liable for the full amount of the plaintiff's
claim. If the answer is not satisfactory there is the further trouble
and cost of standing trial on the issues raised by the answer and the
plaintiff's application. In any event there is the inconvenience and
expense of paying into court the nonexempt portion of the employee's wages and issuing a second check to the employee for the
exempt portion. This is particularly vexing if the checks are
processed on an IBM machine. If all this happened only once it
might be tolerable, but if the worker is paid on a weekly basis the
employer may expect being served with another summons the
following week and the week after that until the payments into
court pay off the debt. That may take a lot of weeks and a lot of
payments and a lot of attorney's fees.
There is little doubt that the use of garnishment as a creditor's
40 Brunn, supra note 27, at 1229.
41 15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1968).
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remedy frequently results in loss of employment. 42 Unfortunately
everyone involved suffers. The creditor loses the only security he
may have for the payment of the debt. The debtor loses the only
means he may have to maintain himself and his family and pay off
the debt. He may look for another job but his discharge carries
with it a stigma that will not easily rub off. The employer, although
only a neutral party, may stand to lose a sorely needed employee.
The public also loses, for the resulting disruption of employment,
production and consumption constitutes a substantial burden on
the national economy. This may be measurable and so may the
cost of keeping the worker and his family on relief, but it is not
possible to assess the social costs of job insecurity, including the
devastating effect that a discharge may have upon the worker as
a human being and upon his family as a social unit.
C. BAMNUPTCY
The number of bankruptcy cases commenced in Nebraska increased from 88 in 1948 to 1,272 in 1969. Of the 1,272 cases it is
43
significant that 1,265 were voluntary and only 7 were involuntary.
There is little doubt that many of these voluntary bankruptcies
were triggered by wage garnishment. This should come as no surprise. An employee whose wages have been garnished is easily
persuaded that he should take the escape which the Bankruptcy
Act offers him. Actually he may feel that he has no alternative
when his employer tells him to clean up his debts or be fired.
A number of recent studies show the close correlation between
garnishment and bankruptcy. The House Report on the federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act, dated December 13, 1967, is typical
in its assessment of the situation:
Testimony and evidence received by your committee clearly
established a causal connection between harsh garnishment laws
and high levels of personal bankruptcies. Statistics obtained from
the Bankruptcy Division of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts further corroborate this conclusion. In states such as Pennsylvania and Texas, which prohibit the garnishment of wages,
the number of nonbusiness bankruptcies per
are nine and five respectively, while in those
tively harsh garnishment laws, the incidents
ruptcies range between 200 to 300 per 100,000

42 15 U.S.C. § 1671(a)

100,000 population
states having relaof personal bankpopulation. 44

(1968): "The Congress finds [that the] applica-

tion of garnishment as a creditors' remedy frequently results in loss
of employment by the debtor, and the resulting disruption of employment, production, and consumption constitutes a substantial burden on
interstate commerce."
43 DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
ANNUAL REPORT 299.
44 H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., ist Sess. 20-21 (1967).

1969
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The creditor, of course, realizes that in garnishing a debtor's
wages he runs the risk of the debtor filing bankruptcy. He hopes
that this will not happen. What he really has in mind is to shock
the debtor into making some kind of arrangement for paying off his
debts. Thus the creditor explains that he uses garnishment only as
a last resort against "deadbeats." But just as it is difficult to,
distinguish between good and bad creditors, so it is hard to know
who are good and bad debtors. In any case, where bankruptcy
results there are usually few assets available for distribution." If
the debtor used bankruptcy to save his job, the creditor who initiated the garnishment quite plainly has lost what was probably his
only chance of recovering at least a part of the debt owed to him.
This was the risk he was willing to take. The unfortunate part is.
that the resulting credit losses are suffered not only by him but
by all the other unsecured creditors of the debtor. All in all thelosses resulting from bankruptcies now exceed one billion dollars.
annually in this country. g
V. NEBRASKA RESTRICTIONS ON WAGE GARNISHMENT
Section 25-1558 of the Nebraska statutes 47 is the key provision:
exempting wages from garnishment. It states:
The wages of all persons who are heads of families, in the hands

of those by whom such persons may be employed, both before and
after such wages shall be due, shall be exempt from the operation
of attachment, execution and garnishee process to the extent of
eighty-five per cent of the amount of such wages; Provided, nothing
in this chapter shall be so construed as to protect the wages of
persons who have or are about to abscond or leaves the state, from
the provisions of law in force upon that subject.
This section was enacted in 190748 and amended in 1969, reducing4
the exempt wages from ninety to the present eighty-five per cent. 9
45

For the United States generally, only 13 per cent of personal bankrupts had assets available to creditors. Countryman, The BankruptcyBoom, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1452, 1453 (1964).
Brunn, supra note 27, at 1235.

46
47 NE. REv. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1969)

The first exemption statute in Nebraska was enacted February 15,.
1869 (Laws 1869), p. 170), and provided: "That the wages of laborers,
mechanics and clerks, in the hands of those by whom such laborers.
may be employed, both before and after such wages shall be due,
shall be exempt from the operation of attachment, execution or garnishee process; Provided, That not more than sixty days wages shall
be exempt." This act was amended February 25, 1873, by inserting thewords "who are heads of families" after the word "clerks." Complete
Session Laws 1873, p. 729. In 1907 it was again amended to read substantially as it does today. Laws 1907, ch. 160.
49 Laws 1969 c. 188, § 1, effective December 25, 1969.
48
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This has been the only change despite the fact that the section has
been the subject of some criticism. 50
Section 42-20151 is also pertinent. After providing for a wife's
separate property, it reads:
Provided, all property of a married woman, except ninety per
cent of her wages, not exempt by statute from sale on execution
or attachment, regardless of when or how said property has been
or may hereafter be acquired, shall be liable for the payment of
all debts contracted for necessaries furnished the family of said
married woman after execution against the husband for such
indebtedness has been returned unsatisfied for want of goods and
chattels, lands and tenements whereon to levy and make the same.
Under this section 90 percent of the wages of a married woman
(not the head of a family) are nonetheless exempt, if used for necessaries. If the affidavit of the plaintiff fails to show what the debt
owing to him was contracted for, presumably the risk is on the
garnishee, although no Nebraska case bearing on this question was
52
found.
The principal features of the Nebraska statutes governing wage
garnishment shall now be analyzed with the object being to subject
each feature to the test of fairness in the light of contemporary
conditions. Perhaps a consensus can be reached as to the desirability of making certain amendments within the framework of
the present statutes. If this is not possible for want of convincing
data, it may be that the questions raised will be sufficiently controversial to merit further study that will lead to agreement as to
appropriate changes. Indeed, such further study may possibly suggest the adoption of an entirely new approach to the problem of
the consumer debtor.
A. THE SINGLE MA
The Nebraska statutes provide no exemption for a person who
is not the head of a family unless that person is a married woman3
Note, Wage Exemption Statutes-Garnishment-Assignmentof Wages,
11 NEB. L. BuLL. 342 (1933).
-1 NEB. REv. STAT. (Reissue 1968).
52 In addition to these sections, the following sections of the Nebraska
Revised Statutes exempt from garnishment payments made pursuant
to certain pension and retirement plans: NEB. REv. STAT. § 19-2056
50

(Reissue 1970)

(municipal employees); NEB. REv.

STAT. § 23-2322

Cum. Supp. 1969) (county employees); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1559 (Reissue 1964) (disabled soldiers and sailors); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-459
(Cum. Supp. 1969) (state patrolmen); NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-1552 (Cum.

Supp. 1969) (school employees); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1324 (Reissue

1964) (state employees).
53 Note 51 supra, and accompanying text.
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or receiving exempted government wages or benefits. 54 Generally,
any person who has a legal or moral duty to support dependent
persons living with him may be considered the head of a family. 55
This limitation is commonly found in homestead exemption laws
and is also found in statutes exempting wages from garnishment.56
It was first incorporated in the Nebraska law in 1873, and the
reason for it is lost in the pages of history. We can only surmise
that among the early pioneers every person was presumed to belong
to a family. Of course the presumption does not make sense and is
indefensible as a matter of policy. It is within the interest of society
to protect a single man or woman from want, job loss and bankruptcy for the same reasons that led to the protection of the head
of a family. When a single person loses his wages and the means
to sustain himself the consequences may not be so dramatic as when
a family of four or more are thrown on the relief rolls. However,
the degree of dramatic effect should not be the standard for granting
exemptions. It may be that a person's status as the head of a family
should be taken into consideration in fixing the amount of the
exemption. This seems reasonable for the myth that two can live
as cheaply as one has unhappily long been exploded. 57

B. PERCETAGE EXEMPmON
The Nebraska statutes exempt 85 per cent of the wages of persons
who are heads of families. 58 The statutes of other jurisdictions vary.
Some exempt all wages.59 Several exempt a fixed amount.60 Many
of them, like Nebraska, exempt a percentage, or a percentage qualfled by a minimum amount, a maximum amount, or both.61 To illustrate: California exempts all earnings from levy of attachment.
It exempts from execution one-half, or such greater portion as is
allowed by federal statute, of earnings for personal services rendered within 30 days preceding the levy of execution, and its
exempts all earnings if necessary for the support of a resident
family unless the debts are for common necessaries or for services
performed by an employee of the debtor.62 fllinois exempts from
54 Note 52 supra, and accompanying text.
5.5 Goodland v. Smejkal, 46 S.D. 112, 190 N.W. 1017 (1922); Hurt v.
Perryman, 173 Tenn. 646, 122 S.W.2d 426 (1938).

GONEB. Bsv. STAT. § 40-115 (Reissue 1968), defines the phrase "head of
a family" as used in the homestead laws.
57 ALAsKA STAT. § 09.35.08 (1962).
58 NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1558 (Cum. Supp. 1969).
G9 Statutes cited note 28 supra.
60 Statutes cited note 31 supra.
61 Statutes cited notes 29 and 30 supra.
02 CAL. Civ. Pno. CoDE § 690.6 (1970).
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collection $65 per week if the debtor is the head of a family and $50
per week if he is not the head of family, or 85 per cent of his gross
wages, whichever is greater; but in no case shall over $200 per
week be exempted. 63 New York exempts 90 per cent of earnings for
services performed within 60 days before and at any time after the
income execution has been delivered to the sheriff or a motion is
64
made to apply the earnings to the satisfaction of the judgment.
It also exempts all earnings of $85 or less per week.6 5
A percentage amount appears to be preferable to a stated dollar
amount which soon becomes outdated. It has the advantage in that
the amount moves up and down with the debtor's wages providing
some degree of flexibility. This may result in a rough sort of justice
for the average family which spends approximately 90 percent of
its income on necessaries. 66 That leaves 10 percent which the law
may divert to creditors without seriously impairing the debtor's
standard of living. Such statistics appear to justify exempting 90
per cent rather than some lower figure such as 75 or 50. The trouble
is that not all families are average. In the case of low income families that spend all their income on food, clothing, rent, and other
essential items, the seizure of even 10 per cent works harshly.
The fact that the creditor in Nebraska can reach only 15 per cent
of the earnings of the head of a family does not make it an ineffective device for the collection of debts: This is attested by its widespread use in the state.67 The threat of garnishment is itself a
powerful weapon to compel debtors to pay. More important is the
pressure it brings upon the debtor through his employer. It is immaterial to the employer whether 85 or 75 or 50 per cent of the
employee's wages is exempt. The inconvenience and expense to him
are the same. Actually in initiating garnishment the creditor expects to obtain payment through an arrangement outside the garnishment proceeding forced upon the debtor by his employer.
C. MnIm-Um AMOUNT
The Nebraska statutes provide no floor below which all wages
ch. 62, § 73 (1970).
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 5205(e) (2) (McKinney 1963).
Id. § 5231(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970).

63 ILL. ANN. STAT.
64
65

66 U.S.

BUREAU or LABOR STATIsTIcs, DEPT. OF LABOR, REP. No. 237-93,

(1965).
Statistics are not available to show the number of wage garnishment
suits in Nebraska. That it is widely used is the common understanding
of the legal profession. In 1969 one of the three justices of the peace
in Lincoln, a city of approximately 150,000, estimated that he handles
about 100 garnishments every month. His jurisdiction extends to $200.
Garnishment suits are also filed in the municipal and county courts.
CONSUMER EXPENDITURES AND INCOME 1
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are exempt. Prior to 1939 it was generally understood that section
20-1559 was to be construed with section 20-1574.68 The latter section
permitted a debtor to file an affidavit that his wages were necessary
for the support of his family, and in such case his wages would
not be garnished. This interpretation would for all practical purposes give 100 per cent protection below the poverty line. However,
in 1939 the Supreme Court held that section 20-1559 and section
20-1574 provided for two different types of remedial process for
enforcing the collection of judgments.6 9 Section 20-1559 applied
where the judgment creditor was proceeding directly against the
garnishee, while section 20-1574 applied only where the judgment
creditor was proceeding directly against the debtor. Accordingly,
the affidavit of necessity was limited to the action directly against
the debtor and was not available in a wage garnishment suit. This
part of section 20-1574 was subsequently deleted.
Many states provide a minimum amount of wages that is entirely
exempt from garnishment. 70 Sometimes the amount is unrealistically low. It should be flexible so as to adjust automatically to
fluctuations in the cost of living, possibly by reference to a cost of
living index with a sliding scale depending on the size of the family.
In Nebraska, as things now stand, the head of a family may have
15 per cent of his wages garnished notwithstanding that they have
fallen below the amount necessary to keep him and his family fed,
clothed and sheltered.
D. MAxnUM AMOUNT
The Nebraska statutes provide no ceiling above which all wages
may be garnished. This seems inconsistent with the principle that
justifies exempting a portion of a debtor's wages. If his wages are
more than enough to support him and his family the reason for the
exemption no longer exists and the excess ought to be applied on
old purchases rather than used to make new ones.7 1 This is what
the debtor with the necessary intestinal fortitude would do on his
own and this is what the debtor with an uncontrolled appetite for
goods which he cannot afford should be compelled to do. In these
cases humane considerations do not outweigh the right of the
creditor to enforce collection of the debt owed to him.
68 Now NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1558 and § 25-1572 (Reissue 1964), respec-

tively.
69 Live Stock Natl Bank v. Jackson, 137 Neb. 161, 288 N.W. 515 (1939).
70 Statutes cited in notes 28-32 supra.
71 Brunn, supra note 27, at 1250-53.
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E. Loss OF

EMPLOYVENT

The Nebraska statutes provide no protection to the debtor against
the loss of his job by reason of the fact that his wages have been
garnished. As discussed above, it is common practice in this state
as elsewhere to discharge an employee after two or three garnishments. The employer is unwilling to assume the administrative
burden imposed upon him by a system of debt collection to which
he is only a passive party. Indeed, it is this very unwillingness that
makes garnishment such a potent weapon. It is the club which in
the hands of an unconscionable creditor may be used to oppress a
debtor and exact from him inequitable terms of payment.
One way to solve the problem is to prohibit all wage garnishments as two states have done. 72 This solution is unlikely to gain
widespread acceptance, being unduly restrictive of the rights of
honest creditors to use the only remedy they may have to enforce
collection from "deadbeats." Another way is to attack the problem
directly as New York has done by forbidding an employer from
discharging or laying off an employee because of the service of an
income execution. 3 This is also the approach adopted in the federal
Consumer Credit Protection Act 74 and the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code. 75 It may be expected that the policy underlying this legislation will motivate labor unions to write into their collective bargaining agreements a similar provision. Furthermore, the problem is
one that is closely related to successive and multiple garnishments.
This feature of the garnishment process is particularly aggravating
to employers and is a principle reason for their hostility to it. With
the elimination of successive and multiple garnishments the pressure upon employers to discharge an employee whose wages are
garnished would be substantially eased.
72

73

74
75

STAT. AN. tit. 42, § 886 (Purdon 1966); TEx. Civ. STAT. art. 4099
(Vernon 1966), The Texas Constitution also provides that "[n]o current wages for personal service shall be subject to garnishment." TEx.

PA.

CONST. art. 16, § 28.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 5252 (McKinney Supp. 1970). The remedial section

of this law reads: "An employee may institute a civil action for damages for wages lost as a result of a violation of this section within
ninety days after such violation. Damages recoverable shall not exceed
lost wages for six weeks and in such action the court also may order
the reinstatement of such discharged employee. Not more than ten
per centum of damages recovered in such action shall be subject to
any claims, attachments or executions by any creditors, judgment
creditors or assignees of such employee."
15 U.S.C. § 1674 (1968).
U.C.C.C. § 5-106.
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F. SuccEssIvE GA~Ismumvsrs

The Nebraska statutes permit the creditor to garnish the debtor's
wages on the same debt as frequently as he chooses, which means
every week if the debtor is paid weekly. Indeed, this is what the
statute contemplates the debtor will do as the employer accounts
only for the wages owing by him to the debtor at the time of the
service of the summons. 76 If the debt is not satisfied by one garnishment the creditor must seek another one to obtain further satisfaction. Such successive garnishments are burdensome to the creditor
who must file the affidavit, to the employer who has to answer the
interrogatories served with each summons, and to the debtor who
must pay the costs.
There is no valid reason why a single garnishment should not
suffice. Some state statutes expressly provide that the wages due
at the time of service of summons shall continue as to subsequent
earnings.77 During the time the debtor is making payment to one
creditor, other creditors are not allowed to reach his wages. There
is the objection that one large creditor may thus tie up the debtor's
wages for an unduly long period. Perhaps this is as it should be
under a system that does not provide for an equal distribution of
the debtor's income among all his creditors.
G. PaRIORITEs
The Nebraska statutes give priority to the creditor who is first
in time with the service of process on the employer.78 The race
belongs to the most alert regardless of the age or kind of debt. An
order of priority based on time is traditional but not essential. It
is not the first unsecured creditor who files a petition in bankruptcy
against the debtor who gets priority; all claimants share equally
in the assets. Similarly, under Wisconsin's personal receivership
statute all unsecured creditors participating in the debtor's plan are
treated equally.79 But if a system of priority based on time is to
be used, it is highly questionable whether the test should be the
time that a summons is served on the garnishee. In the case of
secured creditors the Uniform Commercial Code provides in general
for a system of priority based upon the time of perfecting the security interest which usually means giving public notice by filing
a financing statement.8 0 The secured creditor is thus in a position
76
'7
78

79

NEs. REv. STAT. § 25-1026 (Reissue 1964).
E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRoc. § 5231 (a) (McKinney 1963).
NEE. REv. STAT. § 25-1007 (Reissue 1964).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 128.21 (Supp. 1971).

80 UNIFom

COMMERCIAL CODE

§§ 9-301 and -302.
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to determine roughly his priority at the time he extends credit to
the debtor. It might be that an order of priority based on the
chronological order in which the obligations are perfected by filing
a financing statement should similarly be adopted for unsecured
creditors. 81
H. PREFERENCES
The Nebraska statutes draw no distinction between creditors,
although it is, of course, difficult to distinguish between good and
bad creditors. Such difficulty, however, should not stand in the
way of achieving an equitable classification if possible. Consideration should be given to granting a preference to the creditor who
extends credit when the debtor is able to pay rather than treat him
equally with the creditor who extends credit at a higher rate of
return when the debtor is already overburdened with debt. 82 Again,
there may be justification for limiting garnishment to unsecured
creditors who furnish the debtor with the necessaries. The need
for using this drastic remedy is not so clear in the case of money
lenders and installment sellers who can determine on what terms
they will extend credit. 83 This distinction is recognized in the
statutes of some states which give total exemption except where
the debt
is not for necessaries and needed for the use of the debtor's
family.8 4
I. COUNSELING
The Nebraska statutes provide no assistance to the debtor in
handling his financial problems, either before he has overextended
himself or afterwards. The reason many debtors are unable to
make ends meet is poor management. The public reaction is to let
them stew in their own juice. The trouble with this attitude is that
the juice is not entirely the debtor's own. We are all responsible
in a way for a system of "easy credit" that encourages overextension.
Furthermore, there are too many of them to ignore the problem. As
is true of so many difficulties that a complex society creates, the
individual needs help through education and counseling. Certainly
the situation is one that calls for something more than putting the
debtor through the wringer of garnishment again and again. A
counselor working with the debtor might be able to provide him
81 Wenk & Moye, Debtor-Creditor Remedies: A New Proposal, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 249 (1969).

82 Id. at 263.
83 Note, supra note 26, at 770.
84 Supra note 29.
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with a budget which he understands and can live with. 85 Some
people, of course, will never learn to handle money. There is such
a thing as a credit addict. But counseling would be well worth the
price if at least some of them learned enough to keep solvent when
everyone around them is spending beyond his means.
J. WAGE ASSIGNmENTS

The Nebraska law permits the assignment of wages both earned
and unearned. The cases support the general rule that an employee
may assign unpaid wages already earned and future earnings under
an existing contract of employment 6 unless the subject of this
assignment is the future wages of a public employees7 or the right
is restricted by statute.
The statutory restrictions in Nebraska are few. The Statute of
Frauds requires that every assignment of the wages or earnings
of the head of a family be in writing and signed and acknowledged
by both husband and wife except that payroll deductions for certain
purposes may be authorized by the employee alone.s8 In addition,
the Installment and Chattel Loan Act provides that no licensee
shall receive an assignment of salary or wages in blank,8 9 the
assignment must be executed personally by the assignor and, if the
assignor is married, the written consent of the husband or wife must
be attached 0
The lack of any substantial restrictions on wage assignments is
in contrast with the limitations imposed on wage garnishments. It
would seem that if policy justifies exempting 85 per cent of the wages
of the head of a family in order to protect them from want, the
same policy justifies forbidding a creditor from taking more than
15 per cent of the earnings of the head of a family under a wage
assignment. There is an obvious need to correlate the garnishment
and wage assignment laws; otherwise the rather stringent garnishment restrictions are easily evaded through the use of the relatively
unrestricted wage assignment.9 1 An example of such correlation is
85 Dolphin, Consumer Bankruptcy: A Continuing Problem, 41 REF.
27, 29 (1967).

J.

86 Perkins v. Butler County, 44 Neb. 110, 62 N.W. 308 (1895), aff'd 46
Neb. 314, 64 N.W. 975 (1896).
87
88

First Nat'1 Bank of Columbus v. State ex rel. O'Brien, 68 Neb. 482,
94 N.W. 633 (1903).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-213 (Cure. Supp. 1969).

89 NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-142 (Reissue 1969).
90 NEB. REV. STAT. § 45-144 (Reissue 1968).

91 Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations about Remedies in Consumer-Credit
Transactions, 8 B.C. IND. & COm. L. REv. 535, 562 (1967).
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found in New York. Under the statutes of that state a minimum
amount of an employee's weekly wages is exempt from income
execution ($85) and noncollectible on a wage assignment ($25-30) ,92
and not more than 10 per cent of his earnings is subject to an income
execution and similarly not more than 10 per cent may be collected
on a wage assignment. 93
VI. FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON WAGE GARNISHMENT
After seven years of hearings Congress in 1969 adopted the
Consumer Credit Protection Act.9 4 Title III of the Act, effective
July 1, 1970, is entitled "Restrictions on Garnishment." 95 These
restrictions were found necessary and proper for the purpose of
carrying into execution the powers of Congress to regulate interstate commerce and to establish uniform bankruptcy laws.98
Section 303 of the Act 97 provides generally that the maximum
part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual in any
work week which is subject to garnishment may not exceed the
lesser of (a) 25 per cent of his disposable earnings for that week,
or (b) the amount by which disposable earnings for that week
exceed 30 times the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by
section 6 (a) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193898 in effect
at the time the earnings are payable (now $1.60 per hour).
Section 304 of the Act 99 provides that no employer may discharge
any employee by reason of the fact that his earnings have been
subjected to garnishment for any one indebtedness.
The exemption under section 303 represents a compromise. As
originally introduced the Act exempted all wages from garnishment.100 An amendment was then unanimously adopted patterned
after the New York State law restricting garnishment to 10 per cent
of earnings above $30 per week. This was offered and generally
supported as being a reasonable solution to a difficult problem.' 0'
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 5231(b) (McKinney 1963).
N.Y. Civ. PRc. § 5205(e) (McKinney 1963).
94 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1968).
95 See generaly Moran, Garnishment Restrictions under Federal Law,
56 A.B.A.J. 678 (1970).
96 15 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1968).
97 Id. § 1673.
98 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1).
92

93

99 15 U.S.C.

§ 1674 (1968).

U.S. CODE CONG.
101 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
100 1968

AND
AND

AD. NEws 1978.
AD.NEws 2007.

WAGE GARNISHMENT IN NEBRASKA
Further amendment was finally made to change the basis from gross
earnings to disposable earnings and to lower the percentage from
90 to 75.- Disposable earnings are defined to include only those
earnings which the debtor can spend after making the deductions
required by law. 0 2 Thus, amounts required to be withheld for
social security, income taxes, compulsory retirement, health insurance or similar plans imposed by law, and amounts withheld because
of a garnishment or levy by another creditor are excluded from disposable earnings. However, if amounts are withheld from the
debtor's earnings by the employer pursuant to a request by the employee or in accordance with a contract made by the employee or
on his behalf by a labor union or similar organization, the amounts
withheld are included in disposable earnings since the deduction is
03
not required by law.
Section 303 also sets limits on the maximum amount of disposable earnings that a creditor may reach by garnishment. Therp is
a double test. The following example illustrates its operation: Let
us assume that the. debtor is unmarried and earns $3.10 an hour.
Wages are paid on a weekly pay period running from Wednesday
through Tuesday. During that period the debtor worked 38 hours.
His gross wages are $117.80. The employer withholds federal income taxes of $21.70, social security taxes of $5.18, union dues of
$1.25, and $5 for a Christmas savings plan of which the employee
is a member. Net wages paid to the employee are $84.67; disposable
earnings are $90.92; 25 per cent of disposable earnings is $22.73; 30
times the minimum hourly wage of $1.60 is $48; and the excess of
disposable earnings over $48 is $42.92. Under section 303 the creditor
may garnish no more than $22.73, the lesser of $22.73 (25 per cent
of disposable earnings) and $42.92 (30 times the minimum hourly
wage) .104
VII. EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL CONSUMER CREDIT
PROTECTION ACT IN NEBRASKA
Section 307 of the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act'0 5
states that its provisions do not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt
any person from complying with the laws of any state prohibiting
garnishments or providing for more limited garnishments. For
Nebraska this means that after July 1, 1970:
102

15 U.S.C. § 1672 (b) (1968).

103 UNIFoRM CoNsmER CREDIT CODE § 5.105, Comment 3.
104 UNIFomv CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.105, Comment 4.
105 15 U.S.C. § 1677 (1968).
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(a) A person not the head of a family is entitled to the exemption provided by section 303 of the federal act,'0 6 that is, a creditor
may not garnish more than the lessor of (1) 25 per cent of his
disposable earnings in any workweek, or (2) the amount by which
his disposable earnings exceed 30 times the federal minimum hourly
wage.
(b) The head of a family is entitled to the exemption provided
by section 25-1558 of the Nebraska statutes,'10 7 that is, a creditor
may not garnish more than 15 per cent of his gross earnings. Thus,
in the example given above explaining the operation of section 303,
if the wage earner were the head of a family, only $17.67 (15 per
cent of his gross earnings) could be garnished.
(c) A married woman is entitled to the exemption provided by
section 42-201 of the Nebraska statutes, 08 that is, a creditor may
not garnish more than 10 per cent of her gross earnings if the debt
was contracted for necessaries.
(d) The head of a family is entitled to the exemption provided
for by section 303 of the federal act if such section provides for a
more limited garnishment than section 25-1558 of the Nebraska
statutes. Thus, assume that the debtor is the head of a family and
earns $2.50 per hour. Wages are paid on a weekly basis. During
one week he worked 20 hours. His gross wages are $50. The employer deducts a total of $6 for federal and state taxes. Net wages
paid to the employee are $44 and disposable earnings are also $44.
25 per cent of disposable earnings is $11; 30 times the minimum
hourly wage of $1.60 per hour is $48; the excess of disposable earnings ($44) over 30 times the minimum hourly wage ($48) is zero.
Accordingly, while the creditor could garnish $7.50 under the Nebraska statute standing alone, the entire wages of the debtor would
be exempt by virtue of the new federal law.
(e) No employer is permitted to discharge an employee for the
reason that on one occasion his compensation has been subjected
to garnishment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The garnishment of wages is a very complex and controversial
subject. The right of a creditor to collect the debt owed to him
from whatever property and income of the debtor he can find is
106 Id.

§ 1673.

107 NEB. REV. STAT.
108 NEB. REV. STAT.

(Supp. 1969).
(Reissue 1968).
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basically in conflict with the right of society to protect its members
from being deprived of income necessary to furnish them with a
decent standard of living. As between these opposing interests a
balance must be reached, hopefully one that meets the test of fairness. The following proposals are therefore suggested:
(a) For the short term the author proposes that the legislature act
to remove the inequities that exist in the statutes exempting wages
from garnishment. The key provision was enacted more than 60
years ago and since then times have changed. In 1907 it may not
have been unfair to provide no exemption for single men and
women but it is today. In 1907 it may not have been unfair to give
no assurance that a minimum amount of a debtor's wages would
be exempt from garnishment but it is today. In 1907 it may not
have been unfair to discharge an employee because on one occasion
his wages were garnished but it is today. In 1907 it may not have
been unfair to permit a creditor to garnish a debtor's wages as
frequently as he might choose but it is today. And the same may
be said for certain other features of the Nebraska law.
These inequities should be removed now. Some of them were
partially eliminated when the new federal Consumer Credit Protection Act took effect on July 1, 1970. However, this act was not
intended to displace state statutes. 10 9 The protection which it affords
both as to the maximum amount that is garnishable and the restriction on discharge from employment is minimal. This was recognized
by the draftsmen of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 1 9 Several
states have recently revised their wage garnishment laws in an effort
to make them more responsive to contemporary needs. They constitute a helpful body of precedent.
(b) For the long term the author proposes that the legislature
undertake an extensive study of the problem of the poor consumer
through the various stages of the debtor-creditor relationship: (1)
the inducement stage, (2) the transaction stage, (3) the collection
stage, and (4) the terminal stage."' These stages are all interrelated. This was what prompted the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to draft a single comprehensive
statute regulating the whole system of consumer credit.112 The
109 15 U.S.C. § 1675 (1968).

110 Compare U.C.C.C. § 5.105(2), with C.C.P.A. § 1673 (1969), and U.C.C.C.
§ 5.106, with C.C.P.A. § 1674 (1969)
111 Comment, Wisconsin's Personal Receivership Statute-Evaluation and
112

Recommendations, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 210, 211.
Jordan & Warren, A Proposed Uniform Code for Consumer Credit,
8 B.C. IND. & COm. L. REv. 441 (1967).
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provisions of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code are deserving of
careful study in the interests of both the consumer and the con113
sumer credit industry.
The sections of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code limiting wage
garnishments follow the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act
which in turn follows the traditional pattern of state exemption
statutes. There must be a better way.1' 4 But if the garnishment of
wages is to be abandoned as a collection device a suitable substitute
will have to be found. One fruitful line of investigation might be
the adoption of a state compulsory Chapter XIII proceeding under
which a portion of a debtor's wages is distributed to his creditors
in accordance with a plan approved by the court."15 Debtors and
creditors who have used Chapter XIII appear to be satisfied with
its operation and its wider employment has been encouraged by
those familiar with its operation. Another approach that might be
pursued is the adoption of a comprehensive scheme for regulating
the rights of unsecured creditors along lines similar to Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code which regulates the rights of
secured creditors."' Either Chapter XIII or Article 9 offer interesting alternatives to garnishment. Doubtless there are others. All
merit serious study in an effort to bring about the demise of a
collection device that has proved to be productive of lower living
standards, job insecurity, bankruptcy, and human misery.
113 The following states have adopted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code

at least in part: Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, and

Wyoming. 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE ff 4770.
See Sweeney, Abolition of Wage Garnishment, 38

FoRDEAm
L. REV.
197 (1969).
115 Comment, supra note 111; Comment, Commercial Debt Adjustment:
An Alternative to Consumer Bankruptcies, 9 B.C. IND. & Com. L.
REv. 108 (1967); Note, The Wage Earner Plan, 9 UTAH L. REV. 730
(1965); Adam, Should Chapter XIII Bankruptcy Be Voluntary, 44
TEX. L. REV. 633 (1966); Nadler, Rehabilitation of the Insolvent Wage
Earner under the Bankruptcy Act in Florida, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 465
(1957).
118 Wenk & Moye, supra note 81, at 258
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